Cryptographic Module Guidance

Saturday, February 7th, 2009

The requirements in this section are intended to ensure that all entities using the cryptographic module have adequate guidance and procedures to administer and use the module in a secure manner. Guidance documentation consists of administrator and non-administrator guidance.

Administrator guidance is written material that is used by the Crypto Officer and/or other administrative roles for the correct configuration, maintenance, and administration of the cryptographic module. The administrator guidance contains information [..]

Cryptographic Module Finite State Model

Friday, February 6th, 2009

The operation of a cryptographic module shall be specified using a Finite State Model (or equivalent) represented by a state transition diagram and/or a state transition table and state descriptions. The FSM shall be sufficiently detailed to demonstrate that the cryptographic module complies with all of the requirements of this standard.

Documentation shall include the FSM (or equivalent) using a state transition diagram and/or state transition table and state descriptions that [..]

Cryptographic Modules – Design

Friday, February 6th, 2009

A design is an engineering solution that addresses the functional specification for a cryptographic module. The design is intended to provide assurance that the functional specification of a cryptographic module corresponds to the intended functionality described in the Security Policy.

Cryptographic modules shall be designed to allow the testing of the implemented functionality to this standard, where possible without compromising the security of the module, so that all the services of [..]

Cryptography – Configuration Management

Friday, February 6th, 2009

Configuration management specifies the security requirements for a configuration management system implemented by a cryptographic module vendor, providing assurance that the integrity of the cryptographic module is preserved by requiring discipline and control in the processes of refinement and modification of the cryptographic module and related documentation.

A configuration management system is put in place to prevent accidental or unauthorized modifications to, and provide change traceability for, the cryptographic module and [..]

Cryptography – Conditional Self-Tests

Friday, February 6th, 2009

Conditional tests shall be performed by a cryptographic module when the conditions specified for the following tests occur: Pair-Wise Consistency Test, Software Load Test, Manual Key Entry Test, Continuous RBG Test, RBG Entropy Source Test, and Conditional Bypass Test.

Pair-Wise Consistency Test (for public and private keys). If a cryptographic module generates public or private keys, then the following pair-wise consistency tests for every pair of generated public and private keys [..]

Cryptography – Pre-Operational Self-Test

Friday, February 6th, 2009

The pre-operational tests shall be performed by a cryptographic module between the time a cryptographic module is powered on, either from a power-off state or a quiescent state (e.g., low power, suspend or hibernate) and the time that the cryptographic module uses a function or provides a service using the function to be tested.

Prior to using a security function, the pre-operational test(s) of that security function shall pass successfully. The [..]

Cryptography – SSP Zeroization

Friday, February 6th, 2009

A module shall provide methods to zeroize all CSPs (including temporarily stored values) within the module.

Once a CSP is zeroized, the CSP shall not be retrievable from the module. Zeroization of PSPs, encrypted CSPs, or CSPs otherwise physically or logically protected within an additional embedded validated module (meeting the requirements of this standard) is not required at levels below Security Level 5.

Keys used only to perform pre-operational self-tests shall be [..]

Cryptography – SSP Entry and Output

Friday, February 6th, 2009

SSPs may be entered into or output from a module.  If SSPs are entered into or output from a module, theentry or output of SSPs is performed using manual (e.g., entered via a keyboard or output via a visual display) or electronic (e.g., via a smart card/tokens, PC card, other electronic key loading device, or the module operating system) methods or some combination thereof.

Documentation shall specify the SSP entry and [..]

Cryptography – Environmental Failure Testing Procedures

Friday, February 6th, 2009

EFT shall involve a combination of analysis, simulation, and testing of a cryptographic module to provide reasonable assurance that environmental conditions or fluctuations (accidental or induced) outside the module’s normal operating ranges for temperature and voltage will not compromise the security of the module.

EFT shall demonstrate that, if the operating temperature or voltage falls outside the normal operating range of the cryptographic module resulting in a failure, at no time [..]

Single-Chip Cryptographic Modules

Friday, February 6th, 2009

The following requirements are specific to single-chip cryptographic modules.

SECURITY LEVEL 1

There are no additional Security Level 1 requirements for single-chip cryptographic modules.

SECURITY LEVEL 2

In addition to the requirements for Security Level 1, the following requirements shall apply to single-chip cryptographic modules for Security Level 2.

  • The cryptographic module shall be covered with a tamper-evident coating (e.g., a tamper-evident passivation material or a tamper-evident material covering the passivation) or contained in atamper-evident [..]
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