Multiple-Chip Standalone and Embeded Cryptographic Modules

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This post is part of the Computer Security – Cryptography posts series.

Standalone

SECURITY LEVEL 1

In plus to the necessities for Security Levels 1 and 2, the succeeding necessities shall implement to multiple-chip standalone cryptographic modules for this level of security.

• The multiple-chip embodiment of the circuitry within the cryptographic module shall be covered with a hard potting material (for example., a hard epoxy material),
• or the module shall be incorporated within a strong enclosure such that attempts at removal or penetration of the enclosure will have a high chance of inducing severe damage to the module (id est, the module won’t function).

Security Level 4

In plus to the necessities for Security Levels 1, 2, and 3, the succeeding necessities shall implement to multiple-chip standalone cryptographic modules for this level of security.

• The potting material or enclosure of the cryptographic module shall be encapsulated within a tamper detection envelope that utilizes tamper detection mechanisms such as cover switches (for example, magnetic Hall effect switches, microswitches,permanent magnetic actuators, and so on), motion detectors (for example, microwave, infrared) , or different ultrasonic tamper detection mechanisms as described above for multiple-chip embedded cryptographic modules. The tamper detection mechanisms shall detect tampering by means such as drilling,cutting, milling, grinding, or dissolving of the potting material or enclosure, to an extent adequate for getting at the contents of the module.
• The cryptographic module shall comprise tamper response and zeroization circuitry that shall continuously monitor the tamper detection envelope and, upon the detection of tampering, shall instantly zeroize Critical Security Parameters. The tamper response and zeroization circuitry shall remain operational when Critical Security Parameters are contained within the cryptographic module.

Security Level 5

In plus to the necessities for Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4, the succeeding necessities shall implement to multiple-chip standalone cryptographic modules for this level of security.

• The cryptographic module tamper detection response circuitry or parts shall be secured from disablement,or
• Critical Security Parameters shall be protected from disclosure if the tamper detection response circuitry or parts are disabled.
• Realistic attacks against the cryptographic module include but are not circumscribed to the catastrophic and sudden disabling of the tamper detection response circuitry or parts. If the disabling method renders the response circuitry disabled such that Critical Security Parameters are no more protected from disclosure, this necessity is not met. If the disabling method renders the response circuitry disabled and either concurrently zeroizes the Critical Security Parameters or renders the Critical Security Parameters destroyed this necessity is met.

Embedded

SECURITY LEVEL 1

In case the cryptographic module is incorporated within an enclosure or within an enclosure that has a door or a removable cover, then a production-grade enclosure or enclosure with a door or a removable cover shall be utilized.

SECURITY LEVEL 2
In plus to the necessity for Security Level 1, the succeeding necessities shall implement to multiple-chip embedded cryptographic modules for this level of security.

• The module shall fulfill one of the succeeding necessities.
  • The module’s parts shall be covered with a tamper-evident coating or potting material (for example., etch-resistant coating or bleeding paint) to deter direct observation or manipulation of module parts and to offer evidence of attempts to tamper with or remove module components,or
  • The module’s parts shall be incorporated in a tamper-evident enclosure to deter direct observation or use of module parts and to offer evidence of attempts to tamper with or remove module components,or
  • The module shall be entirely incorporated within a metal, hard plastic or equivalent production-grade material enclosure that may include doors or removable covers.
• If the enclosure includes any doors or removable covers, then the doors or covers shall be locked with pick-resistant mechanical locks utilizing physical or logical keys or shall besecured with uniquely numbered tamper-evident seals (for example, uniquely numbered evidence tape or uniquely numbered holographic seals).

SECURITY LEVEL 3

In plus to the necessities for Security Levels 1 and 2, the succeeding necessities shall implement to multiple-chip embedded cryptographic modules for this level of security.

• The multiple-chip embodiment of the circuitry within the cryptographic module shall be covered with a hard coating or potting material (for instance, a hard epoxy material) that is opaque within the visible spectrum,
• or
• The module shall be contained within a strong enclosure such that attempts at removal or penetration of the enclosure will have a high chance of causing severe damage to the module (id est, the module won’t function).

SECURITY LEVEL 4

In plus to the necessities for Security Levels 1, 2, and 3, the succeeding necessities shall implement to multiple-chip embedded cryptographic modules for this level of security.

• The cryptographic module parts shall be covered by potting material or incorporated within an enclosure encapsulated by a tamper detection envelope (for example, a flexible mylar printed circuit with a serpentine geometric pattern of conductors or a wire-wound package or a non-flexible, brittle circuit or a strong enclosure) that shall detect tampering by means such as cutting, drilling, milling, grinding, or dissolving of the potting material or enclosure to an extent sufficient for accessing or modifying the internal components and the Sensitive Security Parameters of the module.
• The cryptographic module shall contain tamper response and zeroization circuitry that shall continuously monitor the tamper detection envelope and, upon the detection of tampering, shall immediately zeroize all Critical Security Parameters. The tamper response and zeroization circuitry shall remain operational when Critical Security Parameters are contained within the cryptographic module.

SECURITY LEVEL 5

In plus to the necessities for Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4, the succeeding necessities shall implement to multiple-chip embedded cryptographic modules for this level of security.

• The cryptographic module tamper detection response circuitry or components shall be protected from disablement,or
• Critical Security Parameters shall be protected from disclosure if the tamper detection response circuitry or components are disabled.
• Possible attacks against the cryptographic module include but are not circumscribed to the catastrophic and sudden disabling of the tamper detection response circuitry or components. If the disabling method renders the response circuitry disabled such that Critical Security Parameters are no longer protected from disclosure, this requirement is not met. If the disabling method renders the response circuitry disabled and either concurrently zeroizes the Critical Security Parameters and Public Security Parameters or renders the Critical Security Parameters and Public Security Parameters destroyed then this requirement is met.



25 Responses to “Multiple-Chip Standalone and Embeded Cryptographic Modules”

1. Emanuel says:

   I want to find a graduate school with a strong joint math and cryptography and antivirus department ?
2. John says:

   John Hopkins
3. Nick says:

   MIT – Massachusetts Institute of Technology
4. Akash says:

   In reguards to cryptography, what is the Forking Lemma ?
5. Goulden says:

   good article about multiple-chip standalone cryptographic modules
6. Marc says:

   The forking lemma asserts that it is possible to use the algorithm Fto obtain, with non-negligible probability, two signatures ?and ?’relatedin the following manner.

   The arguments to the hash function involved inthe verification operation for each of ?and ?’are identical.
7. Carlos says:

   Gaussian method for matrices and cryptography are related ?
8. Steve says:

   yes they are
9. Julia says:

   For what is public key cryptography used for ?
10. SSH Master says:

    Public-key cryptography uses two keys, one public and one private.

    With the private key you can encrypt ( make unreadable ) your message. Only the person which have the public key can decrypt the the message.
11. alle says:

    What to choose: cryptography or accountancy ?
12. Zoso says:

    If you like math maybe is better to choose cryptography
13. Armed says:

    There are only a few universities that teach you cryptography.
14. xoxo says:

    Cryptography is much more technically challenging when it comes to the mathematics and if you are really wanting a math based career it is probably better suited.
15. Florian says:

    Accountancy it doesn’t use complicated mathematical calculations, but cryptography does.Accountancy is more about working with numbers,about the relationships between the numbers. For cryptography you need to like a lot math.
16. SSL Guru says:

    What areas of mathematics deal with cryptography ?
17. Minko says:

    Hamming codes,MATH 468 Mathematical Coding Theory, Hadamard codes, Golay codes, Reed-Muller codes,Shannon’s theorem, block codes, linear codes bounds on codes, cyclic codes.
18. Carmine says:

    statistics I think
19. admin says:

    The coding theory described would not be related to cryptography. This kind of coding is used to reduce errors in communications.

    Cryptography is an entirely different.
20. Ken says:

    interesting post
21. P. Silva says:

    a very good article about Multiple-Chip Embedded Cryptographic Modules
22. Chaez says:

    What make more secure an encryption ?
23. admin says:

    As you might imagine, the longer the key length, the more secure the
    encryption
24. Remi says:

    What is a policy ?
25. admin says:

    Policy is a generic problem within the area of information security. It is
    the specification of local requirements and processes for specified levels
    of trusted operation.